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This paper seeks to answer two basic questions: what makes the Western
philosophical tradition harmful to the world around us and our survival as a species,
and how can this philosophical tradition be re-imagined as a tool for sustainable
human flourishing? In forming an answer, this paper examines three basic
conceptions of the best human life in relation to the natural world that have been
articulated in Western thought: the city, the farm, and the wilderness. This
examination proceeds primarily through a comparison between key Ancient (Greek
and Roman) and Modern (Enlightenment-era) philosophers, with early Christianity
and Western colonization periods examined briefly as well.
Examining each of these three types of human lifestyle in this specific way
illuminates how our political societies have responded to and interacted with the

natural world and, as the paper asserts, how our political philosophy has become
disconnected from nature or natural elements, creating a political philosophy harmful
to the natural environment and ultimately ourselves. Importantly, each of these social
structures carries with it certain political values, and it is these political values which
require understanding.
In examining these values, further testing, and in some cases adaptation to
modern circumstances, may be required. The examination also reveals why these
relationships with nature exist and, more importantly, why they should continue to
have importance in modern society. It is only by rediscovering and evaluating some
of our most ancient thought on the environment and the societies we live in that we
can gain a clear understanding of both how we as a Western society have arrived at
our modern situation and possibly generate a modern solution to some of our most
pressing environmental problems.
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CITY, FARM, AND WILDERNESS: THE POLITICS OF NATURE

Until very recently, human life has been dominated by and dependent upon
nature and the natural world, from the hunters and gatherers of our Neolithic past to
the countless numbers of peasants, serfs, and farmers who have fed our empires and
cities. This intense and intimate relationship with nature has influenced us profoundly
in a number of ways, not least of which is our understanding of the good life or just
political community. In more recent times, as the majority of human beings live a life
disconnected from the natural world, ideas of the good life have morphed into a set of
criteria mostly devoid of environmental or natural considerations, as increasing
pollution, urban sprawl, and energy consumption attest.
The solution to the world’s environmental problems is not as simple as
adopting ancient values of Greek or Enlightenment thinkers; any efforts to decrease
the destructive elements of human existence and preserve the Earth’s ecosystems
must involve a complex mixture of scientific, aesthetic, ethical, and political
expertise. That being said, one very important element of this process is a deeper
understanding not only of our current worldview in relation to the environment but
also the worldview of those who came before us.
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Many readers may cringe at the suggestion that our future depends on an
appropriate analysis of our past—is it not fair to say that at this point, two millennia
after the dawn of Western philosophy, we have gleaned what meaning we still can
from some of humanity’s earliest thinkers and writers? Leo Strauss provides a
particularly resonant rejoinder to such an argument, saying, “Liberal education
consists in listening to the conversation among the greatest minds. But here we are
confronted with the overwhelming difficulty that this conversation does not take
place without our help—that in fact we must bring about that conversation. The
greatest minds utter monologues. We must transform their monologues into a
dialogue.”1 The goal of this paper is precisely such a dialogue between the Ancients
and Moderns, one that centers on both understandings of humankind’s relationship to
nature. Thus, while the specific thinkers and writers whose ideas inform this paper
may seem arbitrary or obsolete, they were specifically chosen as a way of reopening a
dialogue between ancient and modern philosophy—a dialogue that reveals important
insights into our understanding of nature.
At the same time, an important caveat upon which this paper depends is the
assertion that nature is by and large a human construction. As William Cronon puts it
so elegantly, “That is not to say that the nonhuman world is somehow unreal or mere
figment of the imagination—far from it. But the way we describe and understand that
world is so entangled with our own values and assumptions that the two can never be

1

Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), 7.

3

fully separated. What we mean when we use the word ‘nature’ says as much about
ourselves as about the things we label with that word.”2
Thus, we must enter this discussion of nature’s place in human society
knowing that ‘nature’ as we understand it—the natural world, animal and plant life,
anything that is not distinctly human—will be colored by a particular set of human
values, understandings, and expectations. It is these precise bundles of cultural values
and perceptions that we will examine as a way of more deeply understanding the
different ways of organizing human life. This should help us understand which way
of organizing human life is best, either re-affirming what we claim to already know or
helping us re-evaluate our priorities accordingly.
More closely examining our core political values is necessary in a time when
many assert that “the environmental crisis is clearly part of a larger cultural crisis
which can be resolved only by fundamental changes in the values and attitudes which
reflect the outmoded world views of the West.”3 What are these so-called “outmoded
world views of the West,” and why have they become outmoded? What makes the
Western philosophical tradition harmful to the world around us and our survival as a
species, and how can this philosophical tradition be re-imagined as a tool for
sustainable human flourishing? These are questions this paper seeks to answer.
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Rather than running through a timeline of philosophies and historical events
that shaped Western consciousness of nature, this paper seeks to understand three
basic conceptions of the best human life in relation to the natural world that have
been articulated throughout the history of Western thought: the city, the farm, and the
wilderness. While these three simple divisions of the entirety of traditional Western
philosophy may seem reductionist, they cover a surprisingly wide range of
philosophical ground. In the city, mankind exists in an insulated society, artificially
designed by other humans and symbolically separated from the natural world. On the
farm, humankind acknowledges and celebrates a connection to nature while imposing
a certain amount of ingenuity, technology, and order on the natural landscape. The
farm, then, represents in many ways a mid-point between complete isolation from
nature and complete immersion in it. Lastly, the wilderness is a place where there is
no explicit notion of ‘society’ or human political life—most often characterized as the
“other” or non-human element of existence.
Examining each of these three types of human lifestyle in this specific way
illuminates how our political societies have responded to and interacted with the
natural world and how our political philosophy has become disconnected from nature
or natural elements, creating a political philosophy harmful to the natural
environment and ultimately ourselves. Importantly, each of these social structures
carries with it certain political values, and it is these political values which require
understanding. In examining these values, further testing, and in some cases
adaptation to modern circumstances, may be required. The examination also reveals

5

why these relationships with nature exist and, more importantly, why they should
continue to have importance in modern society.
At the same time that we recognize the environmental and ecological
applications of this inquiry, we must also realize that its conclusions and subsequent
applications should not be confined to mere environmentalism; even if the state of the
natural world was pristine, if pressing environmental issues somehow did not exist,
this investigation would have far-reaching implications for human society. If we
understand why cities are important for human beings to live in and what makes them
counterintuitive to human happiness and the good life, we can engage in better urban
planning and local government policy. If we know the place that agriculture holds in
the human philosophical tradition and what the act of farming represents in the quest
for human happiness and the good life, we can reform our agricultural policy, our
food infrastructure, even our own diet. Similarly, accurately conceiving of what
wilderness can do, both for the good of individual citizens and entire civilizations,
affects our foreign policy, our land management, even our educational system.
In essence, by understanding these fundamental relationships to the natural
world, we can better navigate our present relationship with it. Orienting ourselves
within the long and complex canon of human thought on nature is essential if we are
to make any progress toward the best life, progress that I argue has been retarded by
our relatively recent disconnect from our natural world and some of our most ancient
understandings of it. It only makes sense, then, to begin our investigation with one of

6

the most familiar (and yet little-understood) environments that mankind now
experiences: the human city.
The City
Cities are a complicated element of human society that has changed greatly as
we have; modern New York, Rome, or Beijing is a far cry from a medieval city or
ancient Greek polis. However, all cities share the trait of representing a conscious
grouping of people together for one purpose or another. As such, the city represents
some of humanity’s most self-conscious behavior, behavior that clearly separates
humans from their ‘natural’ surroundings. Early cities used walls, ditches, and gates
and more modern ones have used freeways, parking lots, and streetlights, but the end
result is the same: cities are distinctly not ‘natural’ in the sense that they are not like
nature; they create specific barriers between themselves and the natural world,
barriers which, once crossed, suggest the entrance into a new type of environment,
one dominated by human planning, choice, and intention. People who live in cities
agree to abide by certain social rules, such as where to drive, where to walk, how to
interact with other people, where to live, and how to spend free time.
All of this is to say that no matter how much a Greek polis differs from a
medieval fort town, an Industrial Revolution-era city, a French colony on Mauritius
island, or a modern-day American metropolis, it shares with all of them the focus on
highly regulated human behavior and interaction with the world. Clearly, the
ancientness of cities in human history suggests that there is something extremely
powerful about them as forms of political society. Surely, if we have been living in
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them for thousands of years, they are performing a valuable function and allowing
people to feel they are living the best life and achieving a just political community.
When examining the justness of the human city, Plato is perhaps one of the
earliest if not most significant contributors to the notion. His city is not strictly urban
as we might think of one today, but it is the basic unit of political community;
furthermore, his metaphor focuses on human life and society separate from the
natural world. The primacy of the city emerges from Plato’s conviction that the origin
of humanity is directly tied to the origin of the city; it is for this reason he seeks
justice in the cities before doing so in the individual. His explanation for the rise of
cities comes out of necessity—he argues that men are not self-sufficient and thus seek
one another out as a way of helping each other survive. This is an important aspect of
Plato’s philosophy because it suggests that man is not meant to live alone, indeed,
that he is incapable of living alone or being self-sufficient. From this point on in
Plato’s world, humans are bound by necessity to live together in society. For Plato,
then, the best human life has as its basic assumption a life in political society with
others.
Humankind’s need to live together in political communities stems from
Plato’s assumption about the necessity for the division of labor; he makes it clear that
“it’s impossible for one man to do a fine job in many arts…to each of the others we
assigned one thing, the one for which nature fitted him, at which he was to work
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throughout his life, exempt from other tasks.”4 This assumption of specialization
among people reinforces people’s dependence on others. If a person is only good at
one task, he or she very much cannot live alone but must utilize the services and skills
of other people to survive. This kind of specialized existence definitely separates
humanity from the natural world and a more self-sufficient existence, because anyone
who is going to live off of the land must know a little bit about many different things,
from identifying plants and understanding growing seasons to knowing how to care
for and slaughter animals. Ultimately, humanity’s need for others and specialized
labor necessitates living in the “city” or political community, ultimately isolating
humankind from the natural world by asserting that its ‘natural’ state is one in which
humans coexist with another in civilization rather than alone in the wilderness.
Having demonstrated the necessity of humankind’s living in a city or political
community, Plato then explains (via Socrates) what kind of city it will be, referring to
this hypothetical place as the “City in Speech.” He proceeds to elucidate the basic
human needs of food, shelter, clothing, tools, and trade and constructs a metaphorical
city around them. The end result is a place where everyone has exactly what he or she
needs and nothing more. He explains the simple foods these people will eat, the plain
diversions they will engage in, and the happy, if basic, life they will enjoy. He asserts
that the people in this city “will not produce children beyond their means, keeping an
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eye out against poverty and war.”5 This society is a model of restraint, simplicity, and
contentedness.
Socrates’ model of restraint is demolished by his companion Glaucon, who is
quick to remark that this city is not fit for men, who require more than just the basics
for survival to have a good life. Glaucon flippantly remarks that the City in Speech
should actually be called the “City of Sows;” his revision of Socrates’ metaphor
reflects a different attitude toward human life in relation to the environment. For
Glaucon, having just as much as you need and living simply is not enough. Socrates
indulges Glaucon’s request to amend the ‘just city’ by adding fine foods, luxuriant
fabrics, and other indulgences, remarking “the true city is in my opinion the one we
just described—a healthy city as it were. But, if you want to, let’s look at a feverish
city, too.”6 Socrates’ use of the word ‘feverish’ implies that Glaucon’s version of
human life is somehow unhealthy or contaminated; in his words, once ‘infected’ with
the ceaseless greed of Glaucon, the City in Speech becomes “gorged with a bulky
mass of things not in cities because of necessity.”7
The words ‘gorged’ and ‘bulky’ suggest a certain level of greed,
unhealthiness, and infection in this new version of life; one could go so far as to use
the word ‘unnatural’ in the sense of something (in this case, human society) that is not
its usual self, something which has been modified into something else, a lesser
version of itself. Socrates solidifies this implication by pointing out how this kind of
5
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feverish greed and insatiable desire leads to war and strife between cities as each one
attempts to grow and expand. Unfortunately, the City of Sows seems to be the one
that most of humanity is currently living in, a way of life that jeopardizes our natural
resources, our ecosystems, and ultimately our own existence in the delicate balance
that is life on Earth.
Like Plato, Aristotle asserted the city—a symbol of civilized, cultural man—
as the fundamental building block of humanity; Aristotle even goes so far as to assert
that “the city belongs among the things that exist by nature,”8 as if there were no
other human existence possible but that which involved a political community of
some kind. Like many of his contemporaries, Aristotle viewed humanity as a unique
and therefore separate element of the natural world; Aristotle marked this difference
by our fundamentally ‘political’ nature, arguing that “he who is without a city through
nature rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man…for the one who is
such by nature has by this fact a desire for war, as if he were an isolated piece in a
game of chess.”9
For Aristotle, then, people who do not exist in relation to a center of human
society are disconnected from the rest of humanity, aggressive toward others, and
generally dangerous. Even the chess metaphor suggests that whosoever has the poor
fortune to live unattached to civilization is nothing more than an empty game piece,
manipulated by the gods and fate, without true reason, free agency, or emotion. The
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metaphor certainly drives home the fact that for Aristotle, a man without a city is not
truly a man.
The vital bond between humankind and the polis is made abundantly clear by
a second metaphor: “The city is thus prior by nature to the household and to each of
us. For the whole must of necessity be prior to the part; for if the whole [body] is
destroyed there will not be a foot or hand.”10 Invoking the images of body parts drives
home just how integral the political community is to humankind—it is the body
which contains all other essential parts of life, the entity which binds together all
elements of human existence into a thriving, coherent whole.
Like Plato, Aristotle is skeptical of self-sufficiency, arguing that our need for
help from one another is another essential element of being human: “One who is
incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is
no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.”11 Again we see that cities arise out
of mutual necessity among people. At least from an ancient Greek perspective, cities
are the necessary outcome of being human, a result of our inability to be completely
self-sufficient. This is one way in which we are distinct from other animals, which are
able to survive in many cases on their own, meeting briefly to mate or raise offspring
before parting ways. For Aristotle in particular, living in a city is only something
humans can do at the same time that it is something humans must do.

10
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Having established the city as the hub of true human existence, Aristotle goes
on to further illustrate what separates man from the natural world he lives in. He
begins by explaining “tame animals have a better nature than wild ones, and it is
better for all of them to be ruled by man, since in this way their preservation is
ensured.”12 This is a very anthropocentric assumption and not an entirely accurate
one—perhaps animals that provide textiles or milk are safer under the stewardship of
humans, but many animals certainly do not have a ‘better’ existence under mankind.
While these animals might be safe and well-fed for a portion of their lives, their lives
will be cut short in the service of feeding humans, whereas wild animals have at least
a modicum of control over their own fates.
Aristotle is able to make such a conjecture because of his belief that all of
creation is designed solely for the use of man and therefore has no other value outside
of its usefulness or goodness for man. He explains, “one must suppose both that
plants exist for the sake of animals and that the other animals exist for the sake of
human beings… if then, nature makes nothing that is incomplete or purposeless,
nature must necessarily have made all of these for the sake of human beings.”13
Aristotle’s philosophy of humankind as a unique element of the natural world capable
of taking advantages from the numerous plants and animals solidified an important
development in environmental philosophy, a development which endured for many
centuries, and even exists in vestiges to this day. Specifically, it advocates the
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essential human life as separate from and more importantly, superior to the rest of the
natural world, an assumption whose implications were felt for centuries onward.
At the same time that Aristotle recognizes a ‘natural’ element to human
superiority, he also points out an artificial or political element as well: “For just as
man is the best of the animals when completed, when separated from law and
adjudication he is the worst of all.”14 Aristotle makes clear that law, a creation of
man, and adjudication, judgment by men of other men, are essential to being the best
human. In another deceptively simple sentence, Aristotle conveys a huge
philosophical idea that persisted for millennia after his writing. In essence, in order
for human beings to be the best version of themselves, they must behave according to
a set of self-imposed rules that appropriately shapes their behavior. Formal society
here is the paradigm of goodness. This idea nests perfectly within Aristotle’s belief in
the city as the fundamental element of human existence; essentially, people should
live within a specific group (the polis) that has specific, formal expectations of
behavior (law and adjudication). Much of Western society has followed this model up
to the present day.
And yet, despite both Plato and Aristotle’s attempts to highlight the political
and social city as the lynchpin of human society, the natural world of plants and
animals still held sway over much of human existence. As Stephen Mosley explains,
despite the “ancient ideal… that urban centres should be self-sufficient…the fortunes
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of the first urban centres were closely tied to the countryside around them.”15
Mosley’s words emphasize the fact that no matter how much Greek culture wanted to
differentiate itself from nature through the reasoned and ordered city, it still relied
intensely on the natural world around it.
One of Mosley’s asides proves an important point about cities and how much
they have changed since their formative years. He explains that, “down into the
Middle Ages many cities retained field and orchards within their walls in order to
better withstand a military siege.”16 While this aspect of city life was a practical
answer to the military and political contexts of the time, it also kept the natural world
integrated with city life. Whether the people of the time realized it or not, fields and
farms were not only part of the physical or legal boundaries of the city, but the
societal or cultural ones as well. In today’s world, this coexistence has all but
disappeared—modern city dwellers live in a concrete, asphalt, and steel world where
trees, if there are any, exist within the confines of a sidewalk. Nowadays, a piece of
empty land in the middle of a city is considered an eye-sore, a magnet for illicit
activity, and a depreciation of surrounding property values rather than a valuable
public asset. In certain places in America, attempts to return to this mixture of urban
and agricultural living are taking root; examples include the growth of community
gardens in Detroit in the wake of empty lots created by the housing crisis or
Washington’s “food forests,” parks with fruit trees meant to be publicly available to
15
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citizens. The fact that such projects are considered unconventional and pioneering
underscores how differently our current human culture values land and its potential.
An important complement to Aristotle’s understanding of the best political
society is his theory that nature is, above all else, teleological—it is not driven by
chance, as later thinkers would argue, but by a final purpose, an ultimate end.17 For
him, this ultimate end is the benefit of humanity and human flourishing. This
conception intensely shaped future thinking on nature in relation to human beings,
especially its implications of order and meaning in the world. Many argue that
Aristotle’s teleology simply overlays human conceptions of logical purpose over what
modern day people conceive of as an extremely chaotic, random, and unstable natural
environment. This does not change the fact that his purposive ordering of the world
around us reverberated all the way through the colonial era and beyond, becoming
one of Aristotle’s greatest contributions to Western natural philosophy.
Teleology is one example of a central Western philosophical tenet that has, for
many modern environmentalists, aided and abetted the process of exploiting and
depleting our natural environment. How then can this fundamental idea of nature
having an ultimate end or purpose be refigured in a modern context? Trish
Glazebrook tackles this challenge with a disarmingly simple question: “What would
the tree on whose surface I have scratched this paper be doing if I hadn’t exchanged
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its end for mine?”18 In essence, Glazebrook seeks to disconnect telos from the
anthropocentrism of Aristotle and consider it from a more egalitarian perspective,
weighing human telos equally with that of other parts of nature.
Adopting this philosophy would, in her eyes, cause humans to consider their
actions less in terms of profit, economic value, or efficiency and more in terms of
what purposes animals, plants, or ecosystems are supposedly trying to achieve, citing
the example of letting a field lie fallow so that the soil and organisms can recover and
flourish rather than continue to feed human greed. This idea of re-appropriating telos
in a more environmentally-conscious context brings Aristotle’s well-known theory
into a new light, one that illuminates its continued relevance in the modern world.
Once the city was established as the place best-suited for human living and
flourishing, it soon came to be seen as a place of stability and safety as well. This idea
is illustrated particularly well in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. In his sketch of the
history of political economy, he goes into great detail to explain the economic, social,
and historical events that gave rise to his society. One such detail is his
characterization of medieval “open country” as “a scene of violence, rapine, and
disorder,”19 describing how country dwellers were exposed to the violent caprice of
feudal barons. His analysis hinges on the fact that at that time, cities were areas of
relative stability, a fact that allowed them to prosper. At least from this Enlightenment
thinker’s point of view, the medieval world was one where citizens prospered and
18
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flourished in urban rather than rural areas and where the wilderness was truly wild
and dangerous.
Of course, this portrait is colored by Adam Smith’s own time and place, not to
mention his greater agenda of justifying his economic theories. However, the idea that
the natural world outside of cities was politically and physically dangerous at this
time is certainly plausible. For Smith in particular, the idea of cities as points of
stability and growth for humankind legitimated his own political ideals, which were
that investment and labor should be concentrated in cities, where densely
concentrated groups of people could carry out massive building and manufacturing
projects with the greatest efficiency. To build on ancient Greek ideas of necessity and
division of labor as justifications for living in cities, Smith added economic viability
and efficiency.
Later Enlightenment thinkers re-examined Classical thinking on cities, with
varying results. Rousseau could not disagree more with the ancient philosophy,
arguing that “as soon as one man needed the help of another; as soon as it was found
to be useful for one to have the provisions of two, equality disappeared, property
appeared, work became necessary, and the vast forests changed into smiling Fields
that had to be watered with the sweat of men, and where slavery and misery were
soon seen to sprout and grow together with the harvests.”20 For Rousseau, the societal
bond is destructive rather than constructive. Rather than creating order or helping
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people help each other, cities and societies impose artificial and unfair rules on
people, forcing them to accept abstract concepts like property, currency, and value
which are, in Rousseau’s eyes, completely artificial and unnecessary.
Rousseau argues that “Society and of Laws, which gave the weak new fetters
and the rich new forces, irreversibly destroyed natural freedom, forever fixed the Law
of property and inequality, transformed a skilful usurpation into an irrevocable right,
and for the profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjugated the whole of
Mankind to labor, servitude, and misery.”21 Unafraid to contradict the foundations of
Western philosophy, Rousseau here maintains that not only does society not promote
the best life, but that it directly violates and ultimately destroys a more natural way of
living. To make matters worse, human society is a cage that modern man will never
escape.
Hobbes’ conception of cities and their purpose in human life is more in favor
of cities as the best way of living, but for much more nefarious reasons than Aristotle
or Plato give. Like Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes addresses the question why we do and
should live in cities from a purely practical and logical standpoint; however, he
concludes that it is the fundamental selfishness and violence of human nature which
requires city living. Essentially, he argues that because of our violent and destructive
natures, society is a necessary protection for everyone; social rules and norms protect
us from each other and ensure that everyone can live safely. His political community,
the Commonwealth, requires that people “confer all their power and strength upon
21

Gourevitch, Rousseau: The Discourses, 173.

19

one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of
voices, unto one will…This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a
commonwealth, in Latin civitas. This is the generation of that great leviathan, or
rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to which we owe under the
immortal God, our peace and defence.”22
For Hobbes, then, the value system that gives us the best life is not ‘natural’ in
the sense that it is not found outside of human law. In fact, quite the opposite—an
artificially agreed-upon hierarchy of power and resultant behavior creates the best
life. For Hobbes, we must get as far from our ‘natural’ state as possible in order to
function properly and have a good life. His conception revisits the ancient theme of
humanity’s pure need for one another, but the needs Hobbes characterizes are quite
different, as is the resulting political structure. While the Greek polis centers on
economic productivity and providing for citizens’ basic needs, Hobbes city exists as a
way of protecting its citizens’ very lives. In this way, Hobbes can justify such an
extremely centralized monarchy by juxtaposing it with the violence and disorder of an
apolitical society. We know, of course, that this choice between two extremes avoids
any other kind of political structure, making the resultant choice of Hobbes’ dictator a
false one. However, the important thing to note here is that despite this different
justification for living in a city or society, it is still being upheld, centuries after its
Classical explication, as the ideal form of life for human beings.
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Montesquieu’s understanding of human institutions is perhaps one of the most
environmentally-influenced, even if his ideas are now outmoded and inaccurate.
These ideas are still important because they demonstrate some of the last prominent
political philosophy involving the natural world and its effects on the various
societies who live within it. Specifically, he argues that “if it be true, that the temper
of the mind and the passions of the heart are extremely different in different climates,
the laws ought to be relative both to the variety of those passions, and to the variety of
those tempers.”23 This suggests that humans are profoundly influenced by their
natural surroundings, particularly climate and weather. Because of these people’s
resulting different personalities and understandings of the world, their political
structures should vary accordingly. While this certainly is not a scientific truth we
uphold today, it demonstrates a surprising amount of flexibility on the best life and
society rare in many thinkers of the time. While Hobbes stands firm with his defining
political system, Montesquieu is open to a spectrum of political systems, systems that
are defined by the natural environment and climate of a particular group.
John Stuart Mill also recognizes the differences in cultures and their resultant
political systems, but he does not attribute these differences to climate or other natural
causes. Instead, he sees these differences as varying states of enlightenment or
progress. One of his assertions is that most undeveloped civilizations do not have the
ability to improve without outside help from a more-developed culture; in essence, a
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more developed civilization’s control of a more savage one is the key to bringing it
“rapidly through several stages of progress, and clearing away any obstacles to
improvement which might have lasted indefinitely if the subject population had been
left unassisted to its native tendencies and chances.”24 For Mill, then, human cultures
are defined by their progress toward an ultimate stage of technological and social
superiority (in this case, modeled closely after the European society of Mill’s time).
Montesquieu builds on this idea of societal progress, asserting that more
complex laws should be in effect for more civilized forms of human living. He writes,
“The laws have a very great relation to the manner in which the several nations
procure their subsistence. There should be a code of laws of a much larger extent for
a nation attached to trade and navigation than for people who are content with
cultivating the earth. There should be a much greater for the latter than for those who
subsist by their flocks and herds. There must be a still greater for these than for such
as live by hunting.”25 In other words, the more complex societies (according to
Montesquieu) merit more complex laws. This in itself is not particularly remarkable,
but the fact that Montesquieu arranges human political systems along a continuum of
complex to simple reveals a similar kind of classification of society as moving toward
an apex of civilization that ends with the human city, specifically an economicallyfocused one. Farming, shepherding, and hunting are less-developed and less-complex
forms of human society; even Montesquieu’s use of the phrase “content with
24
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cultivating the earth” suggests that these people are somehow settling for a lesser
form of existence.
With these types of ideas, Aristotle’s telos returns, albeit with a distinctly
economic and technological bent. For Mill, every human society was meant to
progress from a simpler to a more complex one. In essence, Mill is still advocating
the city as the ideal form of existence, particularly the city of European values and
norms. Societies are not achieving their ultimate good if they do not adhere to his
vision of the best life of men, which involved urban, capitalist, and technologically
advanced living.
Importantly, Mill sees human societies progressing towards their fulfilled
potential by changing their form of government—while this seems fairly intuitive to
Western minds, it is a highly ethnocentric claim. If Aboriginal tribes were suddenly
reorganized in a democratic or federal structure, or a European monarchy or republic,
would this somehow make them better human beings with more meaningful lives?
Modern society has seen this same mistake play out in the Middle East, where
Western forms of government have been imposed on Middle Eastern cultures that are
not entirely compatible with them. Changing the structure of a society does not
suddenly transform it into something else—if there was ever to be a true
‘progression’ of a society from one form to another, it would take many years and a
diverse set of changing circumstances, beliefs, and traditions. Yet again we see
thinkers putting forward the idea of the city as the ultimate symbol of human identity,
as the way we can understand and change ourselves, but the answer is not that simple.
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Ultimately, Mill’s top-down approach has social and political change backwards—it
happens from the ground up, among a wide range of people and places, before the
official form or style of government change. Simply deciding to change the way a
society is politically organized is only the tip of the iceberg in changing a human way
of life.
Another problem with Mill’s theory is that while he upholds civilization and a
very specific type of social living as the best life, he also points out the evils of
society as well. “Not only is civilization the negation of barbarism, but it also has to
constantly strive against its internal tendencies to become stationary, to suppress
individuality and non-conformism.”26 It seems humans pay a certain price for living
this supposed best life; the price of sacrificing our individuality and even our free
will. For some people, this is too high a price to pay, and in fact many later writers
and thinkers would travel out into the heart of nature as a way of escaping the
hegemonic conformity of civilized life. Thus it is that despite civilized life’s ability to
stimulate some of humankind’s greatest endeavors and ideas, it often smothers certain
other inherently human characteristics, calling into question the idea that it is the
undisputed best life for humans.
With this more complex understanding of cities and civilized life in mind, it is
important to remind ourselves that living in cities is something most humans at this
point in our history take for granted; for almost all modern cultures, cities and their
surrounding suburbs are centers of most human population and activity. However,
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city-dwelling humans—that is, high populations of people permanently living in a
relatively small area—are not necessarily the ideal form of human life. Stephen
Mosley’s work does an excellent job of highlighting how city life, whether it be in
ancient Greece, medieval Europe, or the modern United States has always created
hardships for both the dwellers and the surrounding environments. Mosley argues
that “Because of the severity of population losses from exposure to infectious
diseases…early cities only grew through a constant influx of rural immigrants. This
has led some contemporary historians such as Clive Ponting to characterize ancient
capitals as ‘parasites’ that drained the surrounding countryside of labour as well as
natural resources.”27 Ponting’s claim suggests that while cities may have been centers
of learning, culture, and trade, they were not necessarily beneficial to most of the
people who lived in them or the natural environments surrounding them.
Especially after the advent of sea trade and an economy of imports and
exports, cities harvested natural resources at an unprecedented rate in order to trade
them for other rare goods. While in the medieval period the effects of such activity
may not have been felt, the increasing growth of cities and trading economies
definitely took a toll on local forests, lakes, rivers, and other natural resources in ways
that changed ecosystems forever. And yet, these effects were not cause for a
rethinking of human enterprises or lifestyles, but rather accepted as the cost of
business and the natural effects of a thriving human populace. If anything, the growth
of economies and progress of society fueled the dominant political structure of cities
27
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despite their damaging social and environmental effects. In some ways, this pushed
human society toward more and more formal social structures, distancing us everfurther from an equally important way of life: the farm.
The Farm
The city, despite its predominance in human political philosophy, is not the
only conception of the best human life. The farm is an equally important development
in the history of mankind—it is often argued that it is agriculture that even made
cities as we know them today possible. In examining the farm as a metaphorical and
literal aspect of human life in relation to nature, the important questions to ask are:
what is it about farming that helps humans live the best life? How does farming and
using nature change the way we organize the rest of our lives, particularly our
political ones?
Particularly interesting answers to these questions again can be found in the
dialogue between Ancients and Moderns, which offers a clear trajectory of the
philosophy of the farm, particularly the migration of the farm from a position of
political prominence to one of powerlessness. At the height of the farm’s political and
philosophical power was a certain Greek understanding of agriculture as a defining
element of humanity; according to scholars like Max Oelschlaeger, “the Greek
mind—arising in the context of agriculture—views culture as an achievement that
separates the human enterprise from the rest of nature.”28 In this instance, agriculture
imposes human understanding, logic, and intention onto an otherwise non-human
28
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nature. The ability to grow food on arid soil or breed wild animals into larger, less
intelligent, and tastier versions of themselves is certainly a triumph of human
ingenuity in many ways.
A seminal Greek text that reveals important cultural and social values on
farming is Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, which focuses on the most basic unit of human
life, the household, as a way of understanding human society and human nature.
Throughout the work, Xenophon writes with a general esteem for farming and the
people who do it. One anecdote concerns the king of Persia, who takes great care with
his farmlands; “whichever rulers he perceives have provided that the country is wellinhabited and that the earth is productive and replete with crops and with every kind
of tree that it bears, these he enlarges with new territory, adorns with presents, and
rewards with seats of honor; but whichever he sees have an inactive country and few
human beings, whether through harshness or arrogance or neglect, these he punishes
and, removing them from rule, appoints other rulers.”29 Clearly, the land and its
proper use have high political value, and for good reason – as a source of food and
industry, the land needed to be stewarded appropriately.
Agriculture’s political priority is evident in Xenophon’s description of king
Cyrus, who would spend part of each day “practicing some work of war or farming.”
As a result, he was considered “justly happy, for you are happy while being a good
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man.”30 This implies that personal virtue is tied both to physical activity and care for
land by making it productive. This is a value which has been largely lost in modern
times; personal virtue nowadays is more closely related to acting honestly or standing
up for what is right, both of which are disconnected from a natural or unnatural
environment. The image of and praise for a king who works the land suggests that
even the richest and most powerful people in a nation should never forget their
connection to the land or their knowledge of it; this is a far cry from modern society,
where farmers are called “hayseeds,” “clodhoppers,” and “hicks.” America’s most
powerful political leaders are expected to be businessmen or scholars, not farmers. A
perfect example is one of America’s most recent leaders, George W. Bush, who
cultivated the image of a Texas rancher and was dismissed by many as ignorant, oldfashioned, and backward.
Cyrus’ example is important because the fact that he engages in acts of war or
farming implies that the two are equally important activities. Valuing agriculture
equally with warfare is no small thing; the warrior is aggressive and violent, the
farmer peaceful and passive. The warrior, if he does his job, brings only death and
destruction, while the farmer nurtures life and ensures human survival. For
Xenophon, though, these seem to be two different sides of the same coin that is
proper human virtue, a value which Western society has largely discarded. Though
this intense focus on warfare and agriculture may seem dated to us now, it certainly
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emphasizes a kind of balance and well-roundedness that is becoming harder to find in
a time when many people’s careers center on a highly-specialized activity.
Montesquieu has an observation similar to Xenophon’s when he notes: “The
historical relations of China mention a ceremony of opening the grounds, which the
emperor performs every year. The design of this public and solemn act is to excite the
people to tillage. Farther, the emperor is every year informed of the husbandman who
has distinguished himself most in his profession; and he makes him a mandarin of the
eighth order…These institutions were admirably well calculated for the
encouragement of agriculture.31 Interestingly, Montesquieu lauds a political leader for
participating in agricultural activities and in encouraging agriculture in citizens, but
not because it makes anyone a better person. Instead, political involvement in
agriculture ensures that it has the public support needed to flourish. For Montesquieu,
then, political leaders who are agriculturally-aware and active ensure a successful and
productive citizenry, not necessarily a morally good one.
Perhaps the reason for the prominence of working the land in forming the best
Greek society and the best person is the earth’s sacredness, something we in the
modern world no longer recognize. As Xenophon explains, “the earth, being a
goddess, teaches justice to those who are able to learn, for she gives the most goods in
return to those who attend her best.”32 The idea of Earth as a divine figure has waxed
and waned with various cultures, but it remains a powerful motivator of good
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stewardship and land management. For the Greeks, the natural world is a source of
bounty if properly stewarded and cared for—something we today may know or have
been told to believe but do not necessarily actively pursue.
Indeed, if we know that sustainably managing land is important, we have
clearly not prioritized it, especially now that we have such easy access to other
environments and resources around the globe. If we ruin the land around us with
chemicals or urban sprawl, we will simply import the things we cannot grow locally.
The relatively low (though rising) cost of fuel and transportation means that
customers in the continental United States regularly purchase produce from South
America or even China. Even though when speaking of increasing globalization, we
like to use the phrase “the world is getting smaller,” in reality it is getting ever larger
and distant—when everything we consume comes from Guatemala, China, India, and
Mexico rather than our own neighbors or local areas, it becomes much harder for us
to understand the negative effects we have on our own environment and the
environment of the places we demand our goods from.
So what does globalization have to do with the idea of humans as farmers?
Essentially, the farm as a way of interacting with the world is largely gone from
everyday life. In contrast to Greek civilization, where even mighty kings participated
in some form of labor on the land, the farm has become increasingly marginalized,
moving across oceans and borders to unseen, exotic places. The dangerous
implication of such marginalization is that it provides yet another disconnect from the
world in which we live. It becomes that much easier to disregard the effects of
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polluted soil or water, of profligate water usage, of harmful fertilizers, pesticides, or
genetic modification of our food. For many modern citizens, living the best life
involves paying the least possible in the produce section, not connecting with land or
the food that comes from it. As expected, our political society reflects these values,
pursuing policies that keep prices low and that provide the highest quantity of food—
like methane-producing cattle or hundreds of acres of potatoes—without regard for
the deleterious environmental, economic, and social effects such policies create.
Xenophon’s own values could not be more different from ours; he even goes
so far as to say that agriculture is the foundation of all the rest of society, “the mother
and nurse of all the other arts…for when farming goes well, all the other arts also
flourish, but wherever the earth is compelled to lie barren, the other arts almost cease
to exist, at sea as well as on earth.”33 Xenophon would certainly be horrified in our
modern world, where many nations import their food from elsewhere and most
people have no idea how their food was made or where it came from. For Xenophon,
a fruitful relationship to nature is the sign of a flourishing human society—human
success is tied directly to a good working relationship with nature.
Indeed, farming is not only good for society as a whole; it is also beneficial to
the individual: “for the gentleman the most excellent kind of work and the best kind
of knowledge is farming, by which human beings supply themselves with the
necessary things….this manner of living is, as a result, held in highest repute by the
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cities, for it seems to provide the best and best-willed citizens to the community.”34
This idea of the gentleman farmer has had its heyday, but in modern times is
relatively rare. For modern man, doing what makes you as an individual happy and
fulfilled is the most excellent kind of work. We have become much more
individualistic in our quest for happiness and understanding, breaking away from this
close and intense relationship with the natural world as a way of finding fulfillment or
goodness.
At the risk of idealizing the farm as the only appropriate way for humans to
interact with their world, we should consider alternative points of view, such as that
of Rousseau, who, as usual, has a bone to pick with Classical philosophy. He argues,
“From the cultivation of land, its division necessarily followed; and from property,
once recognized, the first rules of justice necessarily followed…”35 These rules of
‘justice’ are what Rousseau cites create inequality and breed vanity among competing
members of society. For Rousseau, at least, farming may be the foundation of a type
of society, but not the type humans should want to live in. The farm, with its
insistence on specific plots of land for specific people to use, imposes the abstract
idea of property and with it all the other elements of a modern economy that he
argues diminish human contentment and functionality.
While Rousseau and Xenophon represent diametrically opposed
understandings of how working the land affects human life, there are many other
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gradations of understanding, from the farm as necessity, to transitional stage in
society, to the fulfillment of God’s work. For Roman philosopher Titus Lucretius
Carius, “earning a livelihood is enmeshed in a physical and human cycle: rain from
the skies ultimately brings food to the towns; later the water of the streams returns to
the ocean to be lifted again to the sky.”36 This suggests that there can be no other
way of existing for humans but to be embedded in natural cycles and processes.
Again, this is something modern day humans have been socialized to believe and
understand throughout their lives, but whose daily life rarely reinforces this truth.
Only in the face of natural disasters do humans seem to suddenly remember they are
at the mercy of natural cycles and processes.
Above all, Lucretius’ philosophy focuses on human weakness in the face of
nature’s power: “Lucretius is deeply aware of the physical difficulty men have in
maintaining the environments they create; with failure, carelessness, or laziness, the
thorns, coppice, and weeds will again invade the tilled field.”37 This kind of respect
for and healthy fear of nature’s power to ruin human enterprise is largely gone from
everyday life for most developed countries, removing a very important sense of
humility in the face of nature.
As a metaphorical mid-point between civilization and wilderness, the farm is
in many ways a culture’s transitional space, with elements of both societies
coexisting, often uneasily. We see the tension between farm and city in the writings
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of Giraldus Cambrensis, a 12th century monk who writes with clear contempt for what
he sees as Irish barbarism. He asserts that “in the common course of things, mankind
progresses from the forest to the field, from the field to the town, and to the social
condition of citizens.”38 For Giraldus, while agriculture is the most basic form of
existence, it is meant to eventually be progressed beyond; mankind’s existence,
though originating in the forest, points ultimately toward the city and an urban form
of living. The last thousand years certainly seem to be proving Giraldus correct;
whether this is the best form of existence for mankind is still very much up for
debate.
A second value that is implied by the first is that mankind should work
diligently to dominate and control nature for its own ends. We see this when Giraldus
castigates the Irish for “holding agricultural labour in contempt, and little coveting the
wealth of towns, as well as being exceedingly averse to civil institutions;” he explains
that these people “lead the same life their fathers did in the woods and open pastures,
neither willing to abandon their old habits or learn anything new.”39 For Giraldus, if
the Irish would simply apply themselves to agriculture, they would learn to dominate
and subdue it, use it for their own development, and eventually become like everyone
else in mainland Europe. While Giraldus’ contempt for the Irish probably stems from
a certain sectarianism on his part, it also reveals the value system of the time, which
saw farming as a vital but not final milestone for a successful society.
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One of the greatest eras of environmental change came about during the
Catholic Church’s expansion outward. Holy orders could claim land for God,
increasing the church’s holdings in the process. The mission of these orders was often
to clear the land for agricultural projects and build a church. This widespread activity
was largely responsible for much of the changed natural landscape during the Middle
Ages.40 Importantly, the political structure of the time governed the relationship
between people and their natural environment—in this case, expanding the lands
under Church control grew its political power, and clearing and planting these newlyacquired holdings were ways of making them valuable sources of income for the
Church. Thus one extremely powerful political player had far-reaching effects on the
use of the natural world.
For the Cistercian order of monks, whose monasteries were often located in
remote areas, a balance between untamed nature and complete domination of nature
could be achieved in what Roger Sorrell calls the “English country garden ideal”—
the idea that there is a balanced harmony in which humankind modifies and utilizes
nature in a way that benefits both parties, making nature more beautiful while
benefitting human endeavors.41 This kind of careful stewardship of natural resources
in a way that benefits humankind suggested that “humankind and creation need each
other. Humanity governs and thus perfects creation; creation ministers to people
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physically and spiritually.”42 This sort of symbiotic relationship between man and
nature ensured a certain amount of balance and restraint in terms of resource
consumption and landscape change.
At this point in human history, balance and restraint were highly necessary in
relation to natural resources, which were the foundation of any and all wealth: “Pleas
for conservation arise out of this very sensitive position of the forest. It had to be
cleared to make room for the town, the vine, the crop, but if it vanished, the life’s
blood of the economy vanished, too.”43 Once again, the fact that economies still
depended on control of natural resources introduced a certain amount of restraint into
ecological decisions of this magnitude. Granted, no ecological changes were being
made at the rate or magnitude they have been in the 20th and 21st centuries, but it is
clear that such actions were more evenly tempered by sustainability considerations, if
only out of a desire to keep economies afloat rather than save popular endangered
species.
A later idea that further shaped political systems of the time was that nature
was oftentimes understood as a gift from God to mankind; Thomas Hobbes gives
voice to it when he explains “for the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals,
vegetals, and minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of
the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving
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them.”44 For Hobbes, nature is created by God for human use and consumption and
for no other reason. As a result, Hobbes’ political structure assumes that the natural
world is anyone’s for the taking—this specific circumstance creates the chaotic freefor-all his Commonwealth and Sovereign are designed to counteract.
Aristotle, though espousing agriculture’s benefits, does not mention it as the
best lifestyle or the best way of living. He simply states, “the type of human being
that is most numerous lives from the land and from cultivated crops.”45 This suggests
that while farming may be a successful way of providing enough food for a large
group of people, it is not necessarily the way of life that will be the most fulfilling or
allow humankind to reach its utmost potential. This utilitarian understanding of
agriculture was appropriate for most of human existence, until our population became
a social and economic issue. At this point, when more than seven billion people cover
the Earth, a way of life that allows the population to expand this freely is not
desirable anymore. Knowing as we do that agriculture allows a greatly increased
population in a relatively small geographic area, we should be more judicious about
agriculture’s—and our population’s—expansion.
A writer who advocated more limited and intentional human activity was
Thomas Malthus, who focused on the precarious nature of human existence in
relation to the natural world. In one of his earliest essays, he begins by saying “the
great question now is at issue, whether man shall henceforth start forwards with
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accelerated velocity towards the illimitable, and hitherto unconceived improvement;
or be condemned to a perpetual oscillation between happiness and misery.”46
Malthus’ unequivocal position is that humanity is very limited, particularly by food
levels, which he deduces will never grow as quickly as population does. Taken as a
whole, his conclusion is rather bleak because it proves that there will always be more
people than resources, a condition which can only lead to misery, starvation, neglect,
and suffering. However, his essay is especially important in bringing humanity as a
whole back to reality; he explains that although mankind and the rest of life on earth
follow separate laws of nature (because of man’s power of reason, which creates a
different set of natural laws for him), they both must bend to these omnipotent natural
forces: “I see no way by which men can escape from the weight of this law, which
pervades all animated nature.”47 The idea of a law of nature being truly omnipotent
over mankind was fairly radical at a time when human progress was assumed to be
the ‘natural’ course of development.
In Malthus’ later essay, Principles of Political Economy, he describes yet
another limit to human industry and growth, this time in the countryside. The essay
focuses on where wealth and capital originates, and argues, like many other writers
and thinkers, that the countryside and agricultural pursuits are the most stable and
valuable source of wealth. However, Malthus points out that there is a point at which

46

Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the future Improvement of
Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers (London:
J. Johnson, 1798), 7, http://files.libertyfund.org/files/311/Malthus_0195_EBk_v6.0.pdf), 7.
47
Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 10.

38

the pursuit of wealth from land has an upper limit. Though industriousness and
specific understanding of the land’s workings can increase productivity, Malthus
recognizes that too many people attempting to gain from one resource will ultimately
benefit no one. Eventually, “the progress of wealth would be checked by a failure in
the powers of supply…” leading him to conclude that “all the great results in political
economy, respecting wealth, depend upon proportions.”48 While this is something we
view as mind-numbingly obvious today, the fact that Malthus wrote an entire essay to
argue that humans are not infinitely perfectible and must obey the law of proportional
limits suggests that there was still room for debate on the issue at the time.
The idea of extracting value from land took an interesting turn once Western
societies gained the ability to travel to new continents and form colonies. Early on,
many Western thinkers perceived this new expanse of land as ‘waste,’ despite the fact
that populations of New World peoples already lived and flourished there. This belief
suggests that only by applying Western societal principles of agriculture could land
be made to have value.49 The idea that newly-explored lands were simply blank
canvases waiting to be filled with Western societies only grew with the rise of
colonial promotional literature, which was designed to lure prospective investors and
workers to foreign places. While a certain element of marketing and propaganda

48

Thomas Malthus, Principles of Political Economy (London: W. Pickering, 1836), 253,
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2188/Malthus_1462_EBk_v6.0.pdf.
49
Timothy Sweet, “Economy, Ecology, and Utopia in Early Colonial Promotional Literature”
(American Literature, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), 403.

39

certainly went into these texts, they reveal much about societal values from the time
as well.
For instance, Stephen Parmenius, a late 16th-century writer accompanying Sir
Gilbert Humphrey’s expedition in New England, describes the decision of the crew
not to burn the woods on the shore, even though they blocked exploration of the
mainland: “for feare of great inconvenience that might thereof insue: for it was
reported and confirmed by verie credible persons, that when the like happened by
chance in another Port, the fish never came to the place about it, for the space of 7
whole yeere after, by reason of the waters made bytter by the turpentine, and rosen of
the trees, which ranne into the ryvers upon the frying of them.”50 As Sweet explains,
this reticence to change the environment does not stem from a modern sentiment of
preserving the beauty of the landscape or its ecosystems, but instead out of economic
considerations; the burning of the forest jeopardizes another economic interest (in this
case, fishing) and should therefore be avoided if at all possible.51
Aside from viewing the natural landscape as a conglomeration of economic
goods and profits to be reaped, many of the early colonial promoters argued that Old
World commodities could be replicated in the New World, as evidenced by Richard
Hakluyt’s “Discourse of Western Planting,” where he writes “that this westerne
voyadge will yelde unto us all the commodities of Europe, Affrica, and Asia, as farr
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as we were wonte to travel.”52 Again, this mindset assumes that newly-discovered
lands are simply a physical extension of the Western world rather than an entirely
different natural environment.
Ultimately, this early colonial literature is important because it suggests the
worldview of the time was almost completely economic rather than ecological.
Whether you argued that the New World could grow Old World wheat and orchards
or that it was viable for New World corn and squash, if you were talking about
colonies at the time, it was in strictly economic terms. Land was important only in
what it could yield, in what economic benefit it created for its owners. Thus, we
arrive back at Rousseau’s fundamental complaint—working the land requires that we
understand it as property, effectively stripping it of any other value besides a
monetary or economic one. This is one of many reasons that thinkers throughout the
ages have sought a new relationship with nature, a nature without monetary value,
abstract divisions of property, or signs of human artifice: in a word, wilderness.
The Wilderness
One of the most obviously distinguishing features of wilderness is that, unlike
the city or the farm, wilderness is defined by its lack of human presence. Whether this
is a positive or negative implication varies by thinker and time period, but the human
relationship to wilderness is certainly an important one. We can observe this
importance in the persistence of the man versus nature theme in literature—countless
numbers of some of our most popular stories involve man confronting untamed nature
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as a way of better understanding himself. This is the power of nature as Other: it
serves as a powerful tool for self-discovery and understanding. It can also reinforce
our unique humanness, reconnect us to our environment, or involve any number of
permutations in between. It is to these diverse and multifaceted permutations we now
turn.
A hugely influential idea about wilderness and how it relates to human
goodness and happiness began with the Greeks, who argued that the world as we
know it is governed by an all-encompassing order and purpose, one that human
beings may not be aware of or totally understand. Even more importantly, this order
and purpose is governed by a higher natural law that embodies law as it should be
rather than law as it currently is.53 While this is a simple concept that most Western
societies generally assume to be true today, this one idea has widespread implications
for political philosophy. By investing a normative value in the natural world, it
becomes a mirror for understanding human action rather than something we
understand as truly outside of ourselves. Thus, we look to nature to assure ourselves
that our actions and social systems are in line with an abstract conception of natural
law rather than valuing nature as something intrinsically beautiful, wonderfully
complex, or astounding in its scale and power.
At the same time that the idea of higher natural law creates a value-laden
natural environment, it also is important for shaping our political theory. The simple
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admission that human law is not the end-all of good, worthwhile, or proper living is a
huge development for the Western world. It means that we have the ability to change
our laws, to appeal to virtues and precepts outside of the laws, and to continually
strive to match our existing laws with the ideal natural law we espouse as
fundamentally ‘right’ or ‘good.’ Operating with the understanding that we are
continually striving to achieve a society that does not yet exist is an essential element
of continuing to refine our existence as human beings amid an interconnected living
world. In this sense, aspiring to an ideal society modeled after the ‘natural,’ ideal way
of doing things may be helpful for developing more sustainable and balanced
societies in future.
The idea of natural law was of particular interest to Enlightenment thinkers,
who often challenged and re-envisioned Classical ideas about the ‘natural’ or
‘original’ state of mankind. It is a motif that would manifest particularly pointedly
with Montesquieu, who wrote “Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their
own making; but they have some likewise which they never made. Before there were
intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible relations, and
consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were relations of possible
justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust, but what is commanded or
forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that, before the describing of a
circle, all the radii were not equal.”54 Montesquieu couches his ideas about natural
law in terms of mathematical principles, which were and still are understood to be
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fundamental, unchanging truths about the world. For Montesquieu, at least, justice—
the right or best way of living—is not strictly based on narrow human constructions.
Instead, justice is a fundamental or ‘natural’ element of existence that remains
whether humans acknowledge it or not. Thus, like the Greeks, Montesquieu assigns
normative value to the natural world, viewing it as intrinsically moral or just. This has
important implications because it suggests that human societies should understand
and strive to live by so-called natural justice.
For Rousseau, natural law reveals more about human nature than the natural
world. He argues that “It is, in a word, in this Natural sentiment rather than in subtle
arguments that one has to seek the cause of the repugnance to evil-doing which every
human being would feel even if independently of the maxims of education.”55 For
Rousseau, human beings are fundamentally good before they know anything about
laws and despite having any knowledge of good and evil. This reading justifies
Rousseau’s belief that humans live best in their most ‘natural’ state (he interprets this
as the least civilized form of living) by suggesting that humans do not need
civilization, society, or any of its trappings to be good or ‘just.’ Importantly,
Rousseau’s reading points to humans as a source of goodness or justice, while
Montesquieu and the Greeks point to the outside world; for them, an abstract system
of justice exists in the world independently of humans, while for Rousseau, the
system of justice exists within individual people—a subtle distinction, but one which
informs both men’s thinking on the politics of nature nonetheless.
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Thomas Hobbes’ philosophy could not be more different. He asserts that
without a higher power of law, there is no justness or unjustness; justice is not a
quality of natural man, only man in society: “To this war of every man, against every
man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and
wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power,
there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two
cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body,
nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as
his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in
solitude.”56 Here, Hobbes is asserting that goodness and justice as we know them are
irrelevant in the state of nature—again, this characterization justifies his political
theory by suggesting that our ‘natural’ state is one without core human values and
conceptions. This makes his Commonwealth seem like a necessary and good
institution, an imposition of order upon an otherwise violent and chaotic existence.
While the Enlightenment thinkers’ arguments on natural law are important for
understanding elements of Western societies, all of those political theories assume
that nature is fundamentally knowable and understandable by mankind. This is not
the way it has always been, however, particularly when we examine the famous
words of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, who writes, “nature hides itself.”
No matter how many technological and scientific discoveries humans make, the
natural world still holds a certain mystery. Unlike Enlightenment thinkers, who
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assumed that each and every one of these mysteries could be unlocked through
rational inquiry, Greek thought accepted that wilderness is by its very nature
unknowable. This dichotomy between accessible and inaccessible nature is an
important one that profoundly shapes Western society to this day.
For example, the idea that the mysteries of the natural world can be revealed
by mankind’s reason and intelligence dominated later centuries, becoming
encapsulated in the “veil of Isis” motif throughout the medieval and Enlightenment
eras. In essence, Artemis-Isis, goddesses of wild nature, were portrayed as cloaked or
veiled women who were then revealed by Apollo, the representative of human reason
and knowledge. Pierre Hadot plumbs the depths of the veiled-nature theme, tracing its
development throughout the ages mainly through the lenses of literature and poetry.
Hadot’s analysis sheds light on the especially important ancient Greek philosophy of
lifting and lowering this veil, of more deeply understanding nature versus becoming
aware of the inability of truly understanding nature.
Hadot crystallizes the two differing approaches to nature in Western society
using two Greek myths: the Prometheus story and the Orpheus story. The former tells
of Prometheus, a Titan who is clever enough to steal the mystery of fire and share it
with mankind. While Prometheus is not a human being, he works in the service of
humans, giving them what the Greeks view as the necessary foundation for all
civilization to follow. This myth is important for establishing that mankind can
discover and make use of nature’s mysteries. As Hadot explains it, “Promethean man
demands the right of domination over nature,” using cleverness and wit to steal
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nature’s secrets. 57 This Promethean approach to nature is probably most evident
during the Enlightenment, when an intense interest in understanding the natural world
and harnessing its powers was at an unprecedented high.
The contrasting myth of Orpheus tells of a man gifted with the ability to sing
and play music so beautifully that he could change even the most fundamental law of
nature—death. After his wife Eurydice dies, he travels to the underworld, and through
his uniquely human ability to make music with an instrument, he convinces Hades to
let his wife return to life. While Orpheus’ concern for his wife (and the resulting
fateful glance over his shoulder) prevents Eurydice from returning with him, the fact
that Orpheus charms or controls elements of nature through song is a powerful one
for Western thought. As Hadot argues, “Orpheus thus penetrates the secrets of nature
not through violence but through melody, rhythm, and harmony.”58
This is in direct contrast with the Promethean approach, which is
fundamentally at odds with natural phenomena; Prometheus is known essentially as a
trickster, someone clever enough to steal knowledge from the gods. There is no
attempt at understanding nature or respectfully learning its ways—the only way to
understand nature is to be clever, secretive, and ultimately disrespectful. Orpheus, on
the other hand, uses his talents to make something pleasing for the gods. In this way,
he offers up what human abilities he has in an effort to work within the natural order
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of things. This is a very different approach to nature and one that has been much less
frequently employed by Western societies.
Christianity engaged with the Prometheus-Orpheus idea in its own unique
way, espousing both domination over and harmony with nature at various times.
Several of the earliest Biblical passages reinforce the Promethean approach; for
example, the idea that humans are made in God’s image reinforces the primacy of
humanity in the natural order. If we are made in God’s image, certainly we take on
his attribute of controlling and ruling the world we live in. The book of Genesis,
which explains that God made all of creation for humankind to have dominion over,
also furthers the idea of nature being an object designed for man’s use and control,
placing him above the rest of the natural world as a unique, dominant presence.59 In
essence, humankind is in the world but not of it, an idea which serves not only to
disconnect us from our natural environment but also legitimate our use of nature in
whatever ways we see fit.
An element of Christianity that distinguishes it from many of the other early
religions is that it worships a God who exists above, outside of, or beyond the natural
world we see around us. This is a very different conception of divinity from Greek or
Roman thought, which assumed that gods were very physically and personally
involved with people, events, and places. Christianity’s focus on the otherworldly
serves to disconnect people from their surroundings, displacing nature as the source
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of divinity as it was under the Greeks. In essence, the fact that “God’s immanent
presence in the world through incarnation and the presence of the spirit were never
connected to the physical existence of human beings in such a way that an
appreciation of the importance of nature could develop.”60 Thus, many fundamental
tenets of Christianity serve to further remove human beings from the natural world
around them.
While many of the fundamental tenets of Christianity reinforce a Promethean
approach to the natural world, the later Christian ascetic movement, which embraced
wilderness and untouched nature as a path to communion with divinity, followed a
more Orphean path. Rather than viewing God’s creation in the more traditional sense
(as a gift to be used and ruled over by humans), ascetic monks sought union with
nature as a way of finding God and spiritual enlightenment. Saint Jerome (347 – 420
AD) and many others like him sought to get as far away from orthodox, social or
public religion as possible; this sentiment is evident when Saint Jerome writes, “to me
the town is a prison, and solitude is a paradise.”61 But what is it about untouched
nature and its accompanying solitude that makes it a so-called paradise? How does
wildness help us become better people? Some have argued that “in the wilderness the
boundaries between human and nonhuman, between natural and supernatural, had
always seemed less certain than elsewhere.”62 This interpretation justifies the idea
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that wilderness is a place to find spiritual truth or divine presence, but it still does not
explain how wildness contributes to the best life.
For many early Christian ascetics, wildness was an escape from sinful
humanity, and for many early Christian orders, being located in remote, wild places
was a way of removing themselves from ‘the world’ and communing with God’s
creation; much medieval literature abounds with tales of hermits living peacefully
among animals as a way of returning to Eden.63 Thus wild nature, because it is a
retreat from the hectic, sinful, and material world, is a place where we can pursue
purer spiritual truths and partake in the best parts of existence, essentially purifying
our individual human existence.
One of the most well-known Christian ascetics is Saint Francis of Assisi (1181
– 1226), who is probably most famous for calling animals and other natural features
“brother” or “sister,” as if he were closer to the natural world than to people. Roger
Sorrell argues that this naming of brothers and sisters in nature is a way of
humanizing the natural world in a way that helps other people bond with and relate to
creation as the saint did.64 In fact, Assisi’s famous “Sermon to the Birds” illustrated
his desire to preach to animals as often as to people, in what Sorrell calls “his mission
to restore apostolic harmony to the whole world.”65 For Francis, then, God’s truths
were meant not only for humans but for the entire world to hear. In this way, Assisi
contradicts traditional Christian doctrine by viewing humans as intermingled with
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creation rather than separate from it as so many early Christian teachings emphasized.
Francis of Assisi’s philosophy of nature is important in a Christian context because of
its focus on interdependence and mutual respect between humans and their
environment. Assisi envisions human not simply existing in harmony or peace with
nature, but being friends, equals, and partners with it.66 Assisi seems to want to break
down any barriers between humanity and nature, disagreeing with fundamental
church doctrine that says man is a specially-created and gifted element of God’s
creation.
This humble view of man’s place in the order of the universe can be seen in
Assisi’s Franciscan order, which insisted on naming its religious colonies or
settlements “places” rather than friaries or monasteries. This nomenclature prevented
a distinctly human form of understanding from dominating the natural area, allowing
it to remain the wild and spiritually-conducive “place” it was.67 Though a small
detail, the fact that for this specific group of people, the very language of human
settlement changed because of their understanding of the human place in nature
suggests how powerful our conceptions of nature and ourselves can become.
In fact, the monastic lifestyle of these Christian monks, so often assumed to be
ancient and outmoded, becomes transmuted into a viable modern societal model for
Gilbert LeFreniere, who praises the idea of “locally active community environmental
organizations,” which he views as “centers of ecological learning and holistic

66
67

Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature, 134.
Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature, 42.

51

science….quasi-monastic communities in a world of uncertainty and cultural
transition. Such communities we might call ecosteries on the basis of their debt to
ecological principles and the utopian model of the Christian monastery.”68 For
LeFreniere, the ascetics still have much to teach us about the possible political
structures of future environmental solutions.
Any discussion of the untamed or original natural world must eventually
grapple with the “state of nature,” a philosophical idea of great importance to
Enlightenment philosophers, who used the so-called original or natural state of
mankind as a springboard for justifying their various political theories. Even as we
recognize that the state of nature is in its own way an artificial construction for the
sake of political theory, it still merits examination as a window into some important
conceptions of how humans originally lived and what implications those conceptions
have for modern society.
John Locke’s state of nature avoids generic assumptions about Eden or any
other Christian origin stories. He simply asserts that in the state of nature there is a
law of nature “which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all
mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”69 This suggests that the
state of nature is reasonable and generally safe. Though Locke views humans as
generally good, he also recognizes evil, noting that “a criminal, who having
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renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by
the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against
all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild
savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security.”70
Thus, while men live in a distinct society apart from animals they can, by their
own actions, remove themselves from this society, which returns them to an animallike state of existence. Notice that humankind only leaves society by behaving
unreasonably or badly; this departure from society is considered a step down in
quality of human existence, because these types of people live with the same lack of
reason and restraint a wild animal does. For Locke, political community is completely
divorced from nature as a precondition of existing.
The one connection to the natural world that Locke recognizes is the idea that
each person is entitled to “as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of
life before it spoils…whatever is beyond this…belongs to others.”71 This suggests a
certain amount of restraint reminiscent of Plato’s City in Speech as well as a respect
for the natural world as something to be used but not wasted. Despite Locke’s call for
restraint in terms of human use of natural resources, he still sees the natural world as
expressly designed for human use rather than something with intrinsic value. He
extols a political system designed around increasing agriculture in all ways: “the
increase of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and
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that prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to
secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind.”72 Thus, the
way a ruler can be “wise and godlike” is to work tirelessly at expanding agricultural
activity. Any type of restraint which Locke advocated in terms of individual men’s
needs does not apply in this political situation.
His anthropocentric view of nature is clear when he explains, “it is labour
then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would scarcely
be worth any thing….nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless
materials, as in themselves.” 73 In other words, nature has no intrinsic value, being
valued only by what it can yield to mankind. This implies that wild, untouched nature
has no value because it has not been worked by men in some way. This assumption
about land and value imposes an economic value system on the natural landscape, a
system which greatly affects the resultant political order. If nature has no value other
than what humans physically put into it through their own labor, it becomes important
only as a means for increasing prosperity. A government run on these principles
would not attempt to preserve any feature of the natural world that could not be made
more valuable by mankind.
Hobbes’ conception of man’s original state is a much more violent and
unstable one than Locke’s; in this state of nature, there is “no society,” only
“…continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor,
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nasty, brutish, and short.”74 This implies that human life in nature is miserable and
violent, and can never lead to any kind of progress or growth.
In fact, Hobbes’ assertion that society cannot exist in the state of nature also
suggests that the state of nature is a static or even stagnant stage, where ignorant man
simply fights with other men for nothing more than food or safety. There is no hope
for even a noble savage to emerge, or even a kind of ignorant bliss among early men.
For Hobbes, the natural state is an unpleasant one which can only be escaped by
entering into formal, urban society under a king. While this system neatly justifies
Hobbes’ political philosophy, it also carries the powerful assumption that neither the
wilderness nor humanity’s true or original state of being is of any use to modern
mankind.
While Montesquieu agrees with Hobbes’ idea of a natural state being scary
and vulnerable for mankind, his state of nature is decidedly less violent. He argues
that though ‘natural’ or ‘original’ man is weak and fearful, his existence is basically
peaceful: “Such a man would feel nothing in himself, at first, but impotency and
weakness: his fears and apprehensions would be excessive; as appears from instances
(were there any necessity of proving it) of savages found in forests trembling at the
motion of a leaf, and flying from every shadow. In this state, every man, instead of
being sensible of his equality, would fancy himself inferior: there would, therefore, be
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no danger of their attacking one another; peace would be the first law of nature.”75
Interestingly, while Montesquieu’s state of nature is defined by human fear
much like Hobbes’, this fear leads to peace and stability rather than instability; while
Hobbes’ fearful humans seek political union for safety, Montesquieu’s fearful
humans simply leave one another alone. This has very different ramifications
politically, especially when Montesquieu calls such peace “the first law of nature;”
this suggests that peace among humans is a natural or original element of existence.
Furthermore, the fact that original or natural man, though fearful and weak, could live
peacefully in nature suggests that the natural world—rather than a counterpoint to
human society as Hobbes suggests—can be an element of the ideal human society.
Rousseau’s state of nature is even more idyllic; he describes natural man as
“an animal less strong than some, less agile than others, but, all things considered, the
most advantageously organized of all… sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his
thirst at the first Stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same bed that supplied his
meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.”76 In stark contrast is Rousseau’s portrait
of ‘civilized’ man: “the Citizen, forever active, sweat, scurries, constantly agonizes
in search of ever more strenuous occupations: he works to the death, even rushes
toward it in order to be in a position to live, or renounces life in order to acquire
immortality.”77 Ultimately, this person has no freedom (as he did in his ‘natural’
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state) to live as he sees fit. For Rousseau, this is one of the worst parts of living in a
political society with other men.
Rousseau goes as far as to accuse civilization of ultimately causing human
demise. His praise of the “state of nature” as the best way of human living is
influenced by some of the newly-discovered wildernesses Europeans were exploring:
“The example of the Savages, almost all of whom have been found at this point,
seems to confirm that Mankind was made always to remain in it, that this state is the
genuine youth of the World, and that all subsequent progress has been so many steps
in appearance toward the perfection of the individual, and in effect toward the
decrepitude of the species.”78 This understanding of man as one species in a world
full of other animal species is important, not only for deflating egotistical conceptions
about man’s prominence in the animal world, but also for re-imagining our place in
the natural order as just one of any other countless numbers of species. This is an
understanding of humans that has become central to many modern environmental and
conservation movements.
Rousseau’s solution to our societal degradation is man as the ‘solitary walker,’
a person who seeks union with the natural world, who has broken free from society’s
pernicious amour-propre or vanity. While an ephemeral and rare state for a person to
be in, it can connect him to nature in the way Rousseau thinks people were meant to
be.79 In essence, once we recognize that nature is a part of ourselves rather than
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something that exists outside of us, then and only then will we understand that
destruction of nature is actually destruction of ourselves.80 The understanding that the
livelihood of the natural world is one and the same with the livelihood of the human
race is not altogether common. Though it may be widely known due to public
education about such things, it is rarely truly understood.
Understanding that a world full of ‘solitary walkers,’ is impossible, Rousseau
advocates a new political order, one which will allow “the recovery of qualities, such
as empathy and cooperativeness, which existed when men were closer to the state of
nature.”81 For Rousseau, a society attempting to recreate the state of nature has to be
an agrarian one, where economic growth and progress is not a priority; “the good
political life and the limited, sustainable economy of the no-growth, agrarian society”
are inextricably linked.82
While Rousseau’s vision of the ideal society is one we will probably never
attain, it is helpful in understanding the role wildness and our ‘natural’ states play in
political theory. Rousseau is just one of several important thinkers who advocates
incorporating more of our natural or original selves into our modes of government.
For him, our greatest mistake as humans is not that we ate the apple from the Tree of
Knowledge, not that we developed flourishing societies bent on consuming and
producing goods, but that we abandoned our heritage as animals living in balance
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with the natural world. For him, we are living inauthentic lives that make us
miserable and contribute to our impending doom.
Clearly, the Enlightenment saw a remarkable flourishing of ideas on how
human origins and human nature influence political development. While Rousseau’s
ideas stand out as particularly environmentally-oriented, there are other certain ideas
which grew to prominence at the time that would later comprise modern
environmentalism as well. Such ideas include the public sphere, cosmopolitanism,
and multiculturalism.83 With the ease of reproducing the written word and a
reasonably educated citizenry that could read these words, the public sphere was
born. For the first time in human history, big ideas could be shared among many
people, who could then comment on these ideas in turn. This kind of public discourse
on important issues is certainly an element of modern environmentalism.
Rousseau’s ideas in particular contributed to the growth of cosmopolitanism,
suggesting that humans are not divided by country or culture but united as one species
(albeit a doomed one). This idea is central to environmental movements today as
well. Lewis Hinchman and Sandra Pinchman argue that these ideas of
multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and the public sphere are, despite the
Enlightenment’s bad reputation in regards to the environment, highly modern and
relevant ideas: “An environmental movement that traced its lineage back to the
Enlightenment and wanted to preserve its best features would advocate a society in

83

Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Pinchman, “Should Environmentalists Reject the
Enlightenment?” The Review Of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Autumn, 2001), 669.

59

which a cosmopolitan, educated, and critical public would exercise continuing
vigilance over public policies toward the natural world.”84
Multiculturalism in particular was an interesting element of Enlightenment
thought, as evidenced by Voltaire’s Candide and Montesquieu’s Parisian Letters,
both of which detail travels into new and unknown worlds. These works “launched a
new critical practice: the effort to illuminate the failings of one’s own world by
appealing to the allegedly superior folk ways of other cultures, especially those
traditionally regarded as backward, uncivilized, or primitive.”85 This willingness to
look outside of local culture and find examples of goodness in other cultures is
certainly important in creating environmental awareness and in keeping Western
cultural assumptions and political values flexible.
In fact, the frenzy of global colonization by European governments forced
Western Europeans to interact with other cultures and landscapes, and as a result was
a huge factor in realigning human perceptions of our place in the natural order.
Specifically, newly colonized and unexplored areas of the globe became new
wildernesses for Western minds to grapple with, presenting totally different natural
worlds and ways to live within them. In particular, these new worlds and landscapes
became important metaphorical symbols in Western thought: “the tropical
environment was increasingly utilized as the symbolic location for the idealized
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landscapes and aspirations of the western imagination.”86 Many of these untouched
landscapes became visions of Eden, and an opportunity to re-envision the human state
of nature; these places offered “the possibility of redemption, a realm in which
Paradise might be recreated or realized on earth, thereby implying a structure for a
moral world in which interactions between people and nature could be morally
defined and circumscribed.”87
Tropical islands in particular became extremely important in forming Western
environmental consciousness. Because of their limited geographical size, the effects
of logging, agriculture, and European species of animals on island ecosystems were
readily apparent.88 The loss of animal and plant species, as well as changed climates
on these islands, led to the use of increasingly more physicians and surgeons by
trading companies; contemporary theories about how certain climates affected human
health spurred this development as well. Grove argues that this intense interest in
colonial environments created the first crop of state scientists long before such a
practice arose in Europe.89
Importantly, the primitive conservation measures that were taken on colonial
islands were not motivated by the sentimental or Romantic theories of nature as
something beautiful to be preserved for its own sake; rather, “the long-term economic
security of the state, which any ecological crisis threatened to undermine, counted
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politically far more than the short-term interests of private capital bent on
ecologically destructive transformation.”90 Thus, preserving colonial environments
was a matter of national security above all—here political values (dominating
colonial trade and having a growing economy) dictated human interaction with the
natural environment (preserving those goods which that particular government
needed).
The sudden desire for conservation efforts arose in part because of the selfcontained nature of island ecosystems, which were easily conceived of as metaphors
for the entire globe.91 This increased awareness of the effects of human actions on a
global scale like never before, a very important step forward for human
environmental consciousness. For the first time, human existence as a species was
called into question; “by the early 1860s, therefore, long-established anxieties about
artificially induced climatic change and species extinctions had reached a climax. The
penetration of Western-style economic development, spread initially through colonial
expansion, was increasingly seen by more perceptive scientists as threatening the
survival of man himself.”92
As a result of these climatic and global concerns, conservation efforts were
increased by colonial governments. The island of Mauritius was one of the first places
where pollution abatement and forest conservation were experimentally introduced.
This conservation effort was multifaceted, where “responsible stewardship of the
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environment as a priority of aesthetic and moral economy as well as a matter of
economic necessity. Tree planting, forest protection, climate preservation and
agricultural improvement were all seen as essential components of radical social
reform and political reconstruction.”93 Here we see vestiges of Rousseau’s protoenvironmentalism, which called for comprehensive social and political reform.
In fact, many French colonies became outlets for social and political discord;
for example, Huguenots fleeing religious persecution in Europe viewed these islands
as sanctuaries from religious and political turmoil. In this way, untouched nature
became something of value—a huge turning point in environmental philosophy.
While nature was not yet intrinsically valuable, it had progressed beyond wasted or
unproductive land. Grove argues that this appreciation for wildness led to “….a
fundamental reassessment of the connection between the Fall of Man and the Fall of
Nature…leading in turn to a tendency to fundamentally disconnect the ‘earthly
paradise’ from the Fall of Man.”94 Disconnecting nature from human frailty and sin
represents a sea change in Western thought; essentially, it opens a wealth of new
ways of understanding and engaging with the natural world.
Despite the overweening influence of economic motivations for colonial
expansion by Western nations, other important developments distanced economic
concerns and magnified ecological ones—in particular, Captain James Cook’s
circumnavigation of the globe in 1768. Grove asserts that “the Cook voyage
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effectively separated the naturalist from a direct connection with mercantile interests
and provided the setting for a new kind of scientific critique extending beyond the
discovery of the empirical to embrace a detached kind of social empiricism,
stimulated by the institutional and intellectual autonomy enabled by a ship
circumnavigating the globe.”95
Certainly, the circumnavigation of the globe as an exercise in human
ingenuity and intelligence becomes in certain ways a purely human and scientific
endeavor. While there were certainly economic motivations behind Cook’s exploring
the Pacific (namely, to discover new lands for England to colonize), Cook’s careful
records of geography and flora were hailed by the Western scientific community as
great exploits. In many ways, his successful journey around the globe represented a
triumph of humanity over previously unknown lands and oceans. Cook’s voyage
made the natural world finite in ways it previously had never been, asserting human
dominance over the natural world.
This human dominance of the world was brought to a crashing halt with
Charles Darwin’s famous theories on the origin of the human species, its place in the
order of things, and new fundamental laws of nature such as natural selection and
survival of the fittest. These concepts rocked an already shaken world-view as
humankind came to grips with mass-extinctions, a geological time scale rather than a
biblical one, and the negative environmental effects colonization was having in places
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like India, Australia, and New Zealand.96 More importantly, Darwin’s theoretical
explanation of the history of the human species radically altered previous conceptions
of humankind’s relationship to the natural world by implying that humans were
distinctly non-exceptional in relation to other life forms and that we were actually
much more deeply embedded within the natural order of things than we would like to
believe.
Shortly after The Origin of Species was published, George Perkins Marsh
published Man and Nature, a treatise which hinted at the potentially hazardous effects
of human development on global ecosystems and climate. Though it is easy to assume
he’s just another anthropocentric philosopher, especially when he writes “man is, in
both kind and degree, a power of a higher order than any of the other forms of
animated life,”97 his writings come to a much less optimistic conclusion. These words
hint less directly the great ability humankind had, even as early as the 1860’s, to
drastically alter the world around it, not necessarily always for the better. Marsh’s
warning that “we are never justified in assuming a force to be insignificant because its
measure is unknown, or even because no physical effect can now be traced to it as its
origin”98 sounds like something we hear modern climate scientists saying in defense
of global warming theories, even though it was written more than a century before
such concerns were brought to the fore.
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Aside from being an era of exploration, the colonial period witnessed an
enormous explosion in economic activity as the Industrial Revolution made largescale production and consumption possible. Just as in medieval and ancient times,
human cities were not working in harmony with their surroundings—in fact, quite the
opposite. Smog, ash, and factory wastes polluted water and air, while the large
concentrations of people in one place created huge waste dumps outside of cities. The
intense demand for both resources and employment that such a concentrated group of
people created only furthered these damaging trends. As Mosley writes, “Industrial
civilization did not set out to intentionally damage the environment, but its
commitment to economic growth and development meant that the protection of nature
was until recent decades low on the political agendas of most local and national
governments.” 99
Ultimately, this colonial period for the first time not only demonstrated how
fragile our own existence was, but also our own role in environmental degradation
and change. Charles Darwin’s theoretical discovery fundamentally realigned our
perception of ourselves in the natural scheme of things, knocking us off of the
pedestal medieval and Enlightenment philosophy had created. The colonial
experiment proved that the ideal political community should be one in which we pay
more attention to the environmental effects of our actions and understand more
deeply our part as just one very young species in an incredibly ancient and complex
array of biological life. The ramifications mostly affected the new colonial political
99

Mosley, The Environment in World History, 109.

66

communities rather than the established Old World ones; nevertheless, this era of
human thought was hugely important in shaping our current understanding of our
place in the natural order by reminding us that despite whatever prowess we think we
have, we are ultimately still animals living among other animals and natural systems.
Conclusion: The Politics of Nature
The multitude of understandings and ideas about nature and how humans
should or could interact with it may appear, at the end of this paper, as an endless
stream of human thought, one that is ever-changing and difficult to clarify or distill.
However, sifting through these understandings by not only using the three lenses of
the city, the farm, and the wilderness but also the comparison between Ancients and
Moderns illuminates important truths about the human place in the natural world.
For one, the city, the farm, and the wilderness are all essential elements of
human existence; despite Rousseau’s call for an agrarian society, Plato’s focus on the
human city, or St. Francis of Assisi’s devotion to wild nature, none of these ways of
life is completely successful or fulfilling on its own. Only by knowing and
understanding all three elements of human life can we understand the virtues and
downfalls of all of them. While this conclusion may seem to some as an easy way out
of a difficult question, consider what we have learned through the course of this
paper: no one way of life is completely self-contained or satisfactory.
For example, though Plato and Aristotle hail the human city as the ultimate
form of human society, they acknowledge that it still depends on the farm and the
natural world to exist. Indeed, the fact that their poleis were not strictly urban but
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could also include farmers or shepherds suggests their understanding that humanity
can never completely distance itself from its natural environs. While we can agree
with Plato and Aristotle that the city is in some ways necessary for what we
understand as civilized life, we can also see the merits of Rousseau and Mosley’s
arguments, which underscore the social inequalities and environmental hazards of
living in a highly structured and densely populated society. Ultimately, then, the city
is a necessary but not always ideal form of human existence.
Equally problematic is the farm metaphor—at first blush it appears to be the
perfect balance of the natural and the artificial, where mankind lives within and
among nature while also using it to his advantage. While this form of living in and
understanding nature is certainly more generally aware of the natural world and its
uses, the human element creates the same problems the city did. Rousseau’s
complaint that farming requires conceptions of property and value that breed
inequality, vanity, and discontent remains a valid one.
What we must remember is that despite some of its problems, the farm is, at
bottom, the origin of human flourishing. Before there were great cities, great
philosophers, or great technological innovations, there was the farm. Once we
understood how to manipulate the natural world to give us certain amounts and types
of food, we no longer had to wander in search of it. Modern-day humans have lost
sight of the ancient significance of farming, thanks to refrigeration, internalcombustion engines, and urban sprawl—this carelessness in regard to our dependence
on the earth’s bounty manifests in our political systems, which still subsidize some
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farming activities, but for the most part focus their political energy elsewhere. Long
gone are the days when one of our rulers, like Cyrus of Persia, would consider it
essential to remain connected to the land through some form of agriculture. Instead,
we deride such figures as backward and out of touch.
All of this is to say that the farm once held a prime position in the human
consciousness of nature, and rightly so. As the pivot upon which all of human society
turns, it should be a respected and highly-valued political structure. While Rousseau’s
dream for an entirely agrarian, economically-limited political state is not feasible or
even desirable in the near future, a greater understanding of and priority for working
the land would do our modern societies good. Decisions about government funding,
trade policy, land management, and economic development would be very different if
our political systems better prioritized this unique interaction between humans and
nature.
The wilderness is an equally marginalized conception of human existence,
relegated these days to hippies, yogis, and tree-huggers. While the wilderness by its
very definition excludes what we understand as human society, it is still an important
element of our existence as humans, an element we seem to have forgotten as well.
Saint Francis’s understanding of humans as brothers and sisters with every other part
of the natural world is one we hardly subscribe to anymore, but which, if injected into
our political system, might help restore the balance of humans in their natural
environment. Equally important for modern humanity is the colonial and Darwinian
understanding of humans as just one of many species vying for existence on our
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planet—we have no special condition or right to inhabit the world, only current
dominance in a constantly shifting playing field of climate, flora, and fauna. While
most modern citizens understand the implications of Darwin’s discoveries from a
historical perspective, they often fail to realize that we have overstepped our bounds
as a species, placing untenable demands on natural resources and ecosystems,
demands that will eventually curtail—if not permanently damage—the success of our
species.
Wilderness is perhaps the most vital to our political values today because of
its complete lack of human presence. It is extremely important that we preserve
places in the world that have no trace of the human touch, no seeming connection to
humanity. One of the most basic ways we understand ourselves and who we are is by
comparing ourselves to what we are not, and wilderness is, if anything, a distinct
reminder of our humanness. At the same time that it reminds of our separation from
nature, it can also serve to reignite our wonder and admiration for the natural world
we live in. The kind of bewilderment we experience when we are at the mercy of
severe weather, natural formations, or unending natural landscapes is an important
reminder of our fragility and our dependence on the world around us.
Having explained the significance of each of these political structures or
understandings, it becomes clear why we need all three of them in some ratio. Each
conception of the natural world illuminates a unique facet of human nature and the
world we live in. Thus we have arrived at the answers to the two questions asked at
the very beginning of this paper. The first question was “what makes the Western
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philosophical tradition peculiarly harmful to the world around us and our survival as a
species?” The answer: it creates imbalance in our ways of understanding nature. We
can see this imbalance grow as we move from Ancient conceptions of nature to the
Modern conceptions of nature, where our natural environment morphs from an
integral element of human existence and human goodness to nothing more than a tool
for economic or political gain. In large part, this marginalization of nature as a key
element of political philosophy has led to some of our damaging societal practices
today.
Essentially, Western philosophy has had as its focus the goal of understanding
what makes humans human. This is a worthwhile question, and thus far in our
Western philosophical tradition, this has resulted in a great effort of many minds to
separate ourselves from nature, to better hold ourselves to the light and pick apart our
identity as humans. While this practice has resulted in some of our greatest insights
into our own character and traits, it has also had the unintended effect of
marginalizing the natural environment we cannot help but exist in, ironically
excluding a fundamental part of our identity. This dislocation from place, specifically
the natural place we all share, amounts to a dislocation of a part of our identity from
our common understanding; in the words of Neil Everndon, “knowing who you are is
impossible without knowing where you are from.”100
Equally important to our understanding of place is the recognition of the
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moral and ethical value of our natural environment and our response to it. Some may
argue that environmentalism belongs strictly in the realm of science, since we
understand environmental issues according to climate projections, statistics on
biodiversity, or biological concepts like evolution or genetics. This is a dangerous
assumption to make, one that has led us astray in the past and will continue to do so
again until we realize that a holistic approach to environmentalism, one that
incorporates philosophical values, is essential to future progress in this regard; “It is
no good passing the buck to ecologists—environmentalism involves the perception of
values, and values are the coin of the arts. Environmentalism without aesthetics is
merely regional planning.”101
Additionally, we as a global human species and society must understand that
now more than ever, our natural worlds are inextricably linked together. This makes a
multifaceted approach, one incorporating the city, farm, and wilderness, more
essential than ever. Though governments will always differ on the best or right way to
manage natural resources, organize their societies, or pursue ecological and economic
policy, an essential step forward for everyone is recognizing that we are all in this
together in the pursuit of a natural environment that is economically, socially, and
politically viable. As Cronon writes, it is precisely because of the social and moral
values we implicitly read into our natural environment that “we care so much about it.
It is, paradoxically, the uncommon ground we cannot help but share.”102
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The second question this paper posed at the outset was “how can our
philosophical tradition be re-imagined as a tool for sustainable human flourishing?”
Luckily for us, the Western tradition does not have to be scrapped or replaced with an
entirely new conception. Instead, we must reacquaint ourselves with some of our
greatest thinkers and their ideas, ideas which help round out our conception of the
natural world and rebalance the trio of understandings which are so important to
sustainable human flourishing. Names like Xenophon, Orpheus, Montesquieu,
Francis of Assisi, and Rousseau need to become part of our more common
philosophical and political parlance if we are to in any way create a sustainable or at
the very least less destructive society for future generations. It is only by
rediscovering and evaluating some of our most ancient thought on the environment
that we can generate a modern solution to some of our most pressing environmental
problems.
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